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Abstract
Systemic risk arises as a multi-layer network phenomenon. Layers represent di-
rect financial exposures of various types, including interbank liabilities, derivative-
or foreign exchange exposures. Another network layer of systemic risk emerges
through common asset holdings of financial institutions. Strongly overlapping
portfolios lead to similar exposures that are caused by price movements of the
underlying financial assets. Based on the knowledge of portfolio holdings of
financial agents we quantify systemic risk of overlapping portfolios. We present
an optimization procedure, where we minimize the systemic risk in a given fi-
nancial market by optimally rearranging overlapping portfolio networks, under
the constraints that the expected returns and risks of the individual portfolios
are unchanged. We explicitly demonstrate the power of the method on the over-
lapping portfolio network of sovereign exposure between major European banks
by using data from the European Banking Authority stress test of 2016. We
show that systemic-risk-efficient allocations are accessible by the optimization.
In the case of sovereign exposure, systemic risk can be reduced by more than a
factor of two, without any detrimental effects for the individual banks. These
results are confirmed by a simple simulation of fire sales in the government
bond market. In particular we show that the contagion probability is reduced
dramatically in the optimized network.
Keywords: systemic risk, systemic-risk-efficient, overlapping portfolios,
financial networks, contagion, network optimization, quadratic programming,
government bonds, DebtRank
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1. Introduction
Modern economies rely heavily on financial markets as they exercise im-
portant functions such as capital provision to the real economy sector. Facing
the high costs associated with financial crises, there is a strong societal need
of understanding financial systems and ensuring their systemic stability. When
financial institutions enter into contracts they usually only consider their indi-
vidual risk position and neglect their impact on the overall financial system.
In this sense, systemic risk–the risk that a significant fraction of the finan-
cial system will stop functioning–can be viewed as an externality (Thurner and
Poledna, 2013; Acharya et al., 2017). Systemic risk can be characterized on
three different levels: a total market level Markose et al. (2012), an individ-
ual institution level Battiston et al. (2012c); Thurner and Poledna (2013) and
transaction-based (Poledna and Thurner, 2016). For the purpose of the follow-
ing analysis we define the adverse impact of a single institution on the entire
system as the systemic risk level associated with that institution.
Economic interactions between institutions are manifold and happen on dif-
ferent markets (layers). Therefore, in case of defaults financial contagion can
unfold through many different channels (Upper, 2011). Network models are fre-
quently used to capture these interdependencies, where every node represents
an institution and a link corresponds to financial assets Allen and Gale (2000),
Freixas et al. (2000), Eisenberg and Noe (2001), Upper and Worms (2004) or
Boss et al. (2004). Since these links can represent various types of financial expo-
sures, a natural representation of such systems are multi-layer networks, where
every layer is associated with a different class of financial exposure (Bargigli
et al., 2015; Montagna and Kok, 2016). For example, Poledna et al. (2015) ana-
lyze four layers of financial exposures in the Mexican banking network, including
derivatives exposures and security-cross-holdings. They find that focusing solely
on a single layer can drastically underestimate systemic risk by more than 90%.
Systemic risk in financial markets clearly is a multi-layer network phenomenon.
While these network layers represent direct financial exposures, another es-
sential source of systemic risk arises through the overlap between the portfolios
of different institutions. Financial contagion in this channel can appear in the
following way: an institution under stress is forced to sell substantial amounts
of a particular asset, such that it is devaluated due to the market impact of the
sale. If the same asset is held by other firms, their portfolios suffer losses. This
in turn, could trigger further sales and subsequently lead to a fire-sale cascade
which devaluates the institutions’ portfolios significantly. In case of large losses,
this can deteriorate the equity positions of the institutions (Cifuentes et al.,
2005; Thurner et al., 2012; Cont and Schaanning, 2017). Systemic risk arising
from common asset holdings is different from the examples of direct exposures
discussed above, since here the risk is not manifested in direct exposures between
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the institutions. Systemic risk is generated indirectly by selling not perfectly
liquid assets. Caccioli et al. (2014) demonstrate that the layer of overlapping
portfolios can amplify financial contagion significantly and Cont and Wagalath
(2013) show that in times of financial distress, fundamentally uncorrelated as-
sets exhibit positive realized correlations. This can reduce positive effects of
diversification for individual financial institutions. On the market level, the
impact of asset diversification on systemic risk is non-trivial (Battiston et al.,
2012a,b; Caccioli et al., 2015). It is not straightforward to decide, which mar-
ket allocations yield the most resilient systems. In the context of systemically
optimal interbank networks, agent-based approaches have been introduced by
Thurner and Poledna (2013) and Poledna and Thurner (2016) that show how
systemically risk-free financial networks can evolve in a self-organized way under
appropriate systemic-risk-based incentive schemes.
This paper studies the contagious channel of overlapping portfolios as an
important layer of the financial multi-layer system and presents a general theo-
retical approach that allows us to think of systemic-risk-efficient portfolio allo-
cations. The procedure provides a best-case benchmark which could be a cen-
terpiece for actively monitoring systemic risk on a regularly basis, by observing
divergence (convergence) of the market from (to) the theoretical benchmark.
In Section 2 we introduce a general model, which allows us to quantify
systemic risk in an overlapping portfolio framework. The used data is briefly
discussed in Section 3. In Section 4 we present a method to reduce systemic risk
as a generic network optimization problem and discuss the results in Section 5.
Both networks, the original and the optimized, are compared in a fire-sale sim-
ulation in Section 6. Section 7 highlights practical implications and possible
extensions of this work.
2. Systemic risk of overlapping portfolios
In this section we present a simple general model to quantify systemic risk
for overlapping portfolios, which will be used to minimize systemic risk in the
market. First, we discuss the bipartite nature of overlapping portfolios. Then
we introduce a simple linear price impact model which is needed for projecting
the common asset exposure onto the set of banks. In a final step we show
how the systemic-risk measure DebtRank (Battiston et al., 2012c; Thurner and
Poledna, 2013) can be applied to this network.
2.1. Network of overlapping portfolios
Let us consider two sets of nodes, one representing N financial institutions
(for simplicity called banks), labeled by i = 1, ..., N , and the other K different
assets, labeled by k = 1, ...,K. If bank i is invested in asset k, a weighted link is
drawn between i and k. The weight Vki represents the amount of the investment
in monetary units. A schematic bipartite bank-asset network is shown in Figure
1A.
Although banks are not directly linked, bank i can have an effective risk
exposure towards another bank j, if they hold the same, not perfectly liquid
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asset. If j sells the commonly held asset k, the price pk might decrease to p
′
k
due to market impact and the value of i’s portfolio decreases correspondingly. A
naive one-mode projection of the bipartite network onto the set of banks cannot
quantify the risk exposure between the banks, since the appropriate price effects
due to market impact must be explicitly taken into account.
(A)
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Asset 2
Asset 3
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UK
Figure 1: Financial portfolios as a weighted bipartite graph. (A) Schematic view of an over-
lapping portfolio network represented as a bipartite graph Vki. If a bank is invested in an
asset, the respective nodes are linked by a weighted edge that represents the invested amount
in monetary units. (B) European government bond market represented as a bipartite bank-
bonds network with banks (blue) and bonds (red). The ten most important bond categories
are labeled.
2.2. Price impact
We assume a linear price impact model (Kyle, 1985; Bouchaud, 2010). The
price change ∆pk is a linear function of trading volume and is independent of
time,
∆pk(z) = α
z
Dk
, (1)
where z denotes the signed volume in monetary units, Dk is a market depth
parameter and α = 1, if the volume of buys exceeds the volume of sells and α =
−1 in the other case. Market depth Dk is a measure of liquidity of a particular
security and is defined such that selling (buying) the value Dk100 of security k
moves the price down (up) by 1%. Following the approach of Braverman and
Minca (2014), Guo et al. (2016) and Cont and Schaanning (2017), market depth
is estimated by
Dk = c
ADVk
σk
, (2)
where c is a scaling parameter larger than zero, ADVk the average traded daily
volume in monetary units and σk the empirical volatility (not the implied) of a
particular security measured as the standard deviation of the daily log-returns.
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We set c = 0.4 as suggested in Cont and Schaanning (2017). Note that Dk is
related to the frequently used ‘Amihud measure’ (Amihud, 2002).
2.3. Price impact adjusted one-mode projection
Given the price impact, a proper one-mode projection of the bipartite net-
work Vki can be constructed, which models the exposure of asset holdings be-
tween banks. The value of asset k in the portfolio of bank i is Vki = βkipk, where
βki is the number of units of asset k held by i and pk is the corresponding price.
The total portfolio value of bank i is Vi =
∑
k βkipk. Consider a bank j, which
holds the same asset k. The maximum loss that j can experience from sales
of k by bank i is Vkj
Vki
Dk
. The overall exposure from i to j, i.e. the maximum
impact of i on j, is
wij =
K∑
k=1
VkjVki
1
Dk
. (3)
In matrix form, the weighted N ×N adjacency matrix is given by
w = V >D−1V , (4)
where V is the K × N matrix of asset values in the portfolios containing Vki
and D is a K × K diagonal matrix with diagonal elements Dkk = Dk. The
weighted adjacency matrix w has elements on its diagonal and thus contains
self-loops which represent the exposure towards sales from the own portfolio.
Equation (4) corresponds to a simple one-mode projection of a bipartite network
that is corrected for limited liquidity of the assets. Equation (3) is closely related
to the model studied in Cont and Schaanning (2017), where the linear price
impact is also a function of monetary units. In contrast, Braverman and Minca
(2014) and Guo et al. (2016) base their definition of the price impact on units of
assets. Note that ‘liquidity is an elusive concept’ Amihud (2002) and different
concepts of liquidity and associated price impacts do exist (Bouchaud et al.,
2009; Bouchaud, 2010). The reason for our choice of Equation (3) is simplicity
only. It can be generalized easily to more refined price impact functions.
2.4. DebtRank for overlapping portfolio networks
A measure of systemic risk introduced by Battiston et al. (2012c) and applied
to the interbank market (Thurner and Poledna, 2013) is the so-called DebtRank
(DR). DR is a feedback centrality measure for financial networks that ascribes
to every bank a systemic risk level between zero and one, where one means that
the entire network will default in case of the bank’s bankruptcy (for the detailed
definition see Appendix A). DR was constructed for direct financial exposures
between nodes, such as networks of interbank liabilities, but can be adapted for
indirect exposures wij of common asset holdings. A central element for applying
DR to a financial network is the impact matrix
Wij = min
{
1,
Aij
Ej
}
, (5)
5
where Aij is the direct exposure in monetary units from j to i and Ej the (Tier
1) equity of j. By defining the relative economic value of node j as
vj =
∑
iAij∑
i
∑
j Aij
, (6)
the DR of bank i can be represented as
Ri =
∑
j
hj(T )vj −
∑
j
hj(1)vj , (7)
where hj is a state variable which sums up the financial distress in the whole
network based on the impact matrix Wij . The state variable is necessary, since
DR cannot be represented in closed form (see Appendix A for details).
Equation (3) allows us to derive an impact matrix for the overlapping port-
folio network model. The DR impact matrix for overlapping portfolios is
W˜ij = min
{
1,
wij
Ej
}
, (8)
which is the total impact of i on j if i sells its entire portfolio. The impact
W˜ij is bounded between zero and one, where one means that the total equity
buffer of j is ‘destructed’ due to the sales of i. The relative economic value in
an overlapping portfolio setting is given by
v˜i =
Vi∑
k
∑
j Vkj
. (9)
By replacing Equation (5) with Equation (8) and Equation (6) with Equa-
tion (9), Equation (7) can be applied to financial networks of asset holdings and
a systemic risk assessments can be carried out in the usual way. To characterize
the systemic risk level of the entire market, we compute the average DR of all
N banks
R¯ =
1
N
N∑
i=1
Ri . (10)
3. Data
We compute exposures from common asset holdings for the government bond
portfolios of European banks that were used in the EU-wide stress test 2016.
The data is publicly available and provided by the European Banking Authority
(EBA)1. In our analysis we include 49 major European banks that are invested
in 36 different sovereign bonds. The obtained bipartite network Vki represents
investments of European banks in government bonds, see Figure 1B. We refer
1http://www.eba.europa.eu/risk-analysis-and-data/eu-wide-stress-testing/2016
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to this network as the European government bond market in the remainder of
this text. The total market volume amounts to EUR 2, 617.39 billion and corre-
sponds to roughly 10% of the banks’ total assets. The investment in government
debt as a share of total assets varies substantially. While for some banks govern-
ment bonds account only for a few percent of the total asset size, others spend
a large fraction of up to 47% of total assets in government debt.
To estimate the market depth of the bonds we pool market price data with
reported data on trading activity and outstanding volume. A detailed descrip-
tion of the data and the estimation procedure is found in the Supplementary
Information. The summary statistics of the market depths estimates is displayed
in Table 1.
4. Optimizing systemic risk
In this section we show that we can use DR to derive a mathematical op-
timization problem that allows us to compute systemic-risk-efficient portfolio
allocations for the European government bond market. By rewiring the bipar-
tite bank-bond network, we can obtain a different impact matrix W˜ij , which
leads to a lower level of systemic risk in the market R¯. We must ensure that
after the rewiring of the bipartite bank-bond network no institution is economi-
cally worse off than before. We characterize the quality of the banks’ portfolios
within the classical mean-variance framework of Markowitz (1952). A difficulty
arising when optimizing a network with respect to its average DR R¯ is the fact
that DR is not representable in closed form. A reasonable approximation is to
focus on the direct impacts W˜ v˜ instead. By doing so, a quadratic optimization
problem can be formulated.
Let σ2kl be the covariance of bond k and l, and let rk denote the expected
return of bond k. The expected return and variance of portfolio i – the risk
profile– are given by r˜i =
∑
k Vkirk and σ˜i
2 =
∑
k
∑
l VkiVliσ
2
kl, respectively.
The total value of bond k in the market is denoted as Sk. Consider the following
optimization problem,
min
xki≥0 ∀k,i
∑
i
∑
j
v˜j
Ej
∑
k
xkixkj
1
Dk
subject to Vi =
∑
k
xki, ∀i,
Sk =
∑
i
xki, ∀k,
r˜i ≤
∑
k
xkirk, ∀i,
σ˜i
2 ≥
∑
k
∑
l
xkixliσ
2
kl, ∀i,
(11)
where the variable xki denotes the investments that can be reallocated. Problem
(11) minimizes the total direct impacts in case of defaults without deteriorat-
ing the banks’ risk profiles. By doing so, the total portfolio volumes and the
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total outstanding volumes are kept constant, i.e. the network is only rewired.
The minimum operators in the impact matrix W˜ are dropped in order to en-
sure smoothness of the objective function, which simplifies the optimization.
Problem (11) can now be reformulated as a general quadratically constrained
quadratic program (QCQP) of the form
min
y≥0
1
2
y>(P>0 + P0)y
subject to y>Piy − σ˜i ≤ 0, i = 1, ..., N,
A1y + c1 ≤ 0,
A2y + c2 = 0.
(12)
Here, P0 and Pi are KN ×KN matrices, A1 is a N ×KN matrix, A2 a (K +
N) × KN -matrix and c1 and c2 are vectors of corresponding dimensions. We
let y = vec(X) be the vectorization of the K ×N matrix X with elements xki.
The exact specifications of the vectors and matrices are given in Appendix B.
The quadratic constraint ensures that new portfolio allocations do not increase
the portfolio variances and the linear inequality constraint prevents a decrease
of the portfolio returns. The linear equality constraint controls for the basic
market structure, such that the portfolios are only reshuffled, but not changed
in total size and no assets are added or removed from the market.
4.1. Solving the optimization problem
The described dataset consists of 36 bonds and 49 banks (1, 764 variables).
We are bound to 85 linear equality constraints, 49 linear inequality constraints
and 49 quadratic constraints. Expected returns are estimated from historical
returns. The portfolio variances are calculated from historical price data, see
Supplementary Information. The symmetric matrix Pi is positive semidefinite
since it is a block diagonal matrix with the covariance matrix on its diagonal.
However, it turns out that in our case the matrix 12 (P
>
0 +P0) is indefinite, which
turns the problem into a non-convex QCQP problem. Its solutions are in general
NP-hard to find (Anstreicher, 2009). Nevertheless, there are solvers available
that can handle this type of problem, for instance by implementing branch-and-
bound algorithms. To solve Problem (12), we run it on four different solvers:
KNITRO (Byrd et al., 2006), BARON (Sahinidis, 1996), MINOS (Murtagh and
Saunders, 1983) and Couenne (Belotti et al., 2009). We formulated the problem
in AMPL (Fourer et al., 1990) and made use of the NEOS-server (Czyzyk et al.,
1998), where we submitted it to the four solvers. In the following we show the
results from the Couenne solver, which provides the minimal objective values.
5. Results
We first compute the DR for every bank and estimate the average total over-
lapping portfolio systemic risk R¯orig = 6.66% in the European government bond
market. We then optimize the portfolio holdings according to Equation (12) and
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Figure 2: (A) Comparison of DRs of banks before (red) and after (green) optimization. Banks
are ordered from the most to the least systemic bank in the original network. After the re-
organization of the network (green), systemic risk levels of the initially most relevant banks
are reduced, whereas some of the least significant banks increase their DRs in the optimized
network. (B) DR versus market share for all banks before (red) and after (green) optimiza-
tion. Banks in the upper left corner (red) represent the group of banks with a high DR to
market share ratio. The optimization of the network improves the systemic risk relevance of
these banks dramatically (green). Overall, the slope of the positive relation between systemic
relevance and market size decreases in the optimized network.
compute R¯opt = 2.89%
2. We see that systemic risk of the market is reduced by
more than a half (factor of 2.27) and the maximum DR in the financial network
decreases from 0.22 to 0.09, see Table 1. In particular banks with originally
high systemic risk levels loose systemic relevance in the market. For some of
the least systemic banks the DR levels increase, and overall, a more systemic-
risk-efficient allocation is achieved (Figure 2A). The optimization also changes
the order of systemic relevance of banks, i.e. a bank that was considered riskier
than another particular bank in the original network can be relatively less risky
in the optimized network. Overall, the order of systemic relevance changes in
the optimized network, but is still positively correlated with the original orders,
see Table 1.
Intuitively, a positive relationship between banks’ systemic relevance and
market share can be expected. Figure 2B shows that this positive relationship
(slope) is reduced in the optimized network. From a systemic risk management
perspective, particularly problematic banks are those banks which are relatively
small in size, but take on very central positions in the network (upper left corner
(red) in Figure 2B), meaning that the default of a small bank has adverse effects
2Note that the scaling parameter c in Equation (2) affects the liquidity of the market and
therefore also the exposure between the banks. Appendix C discusses how the choice of c
affects systemic risk in the European government bond market and its implications for the
optimization.
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(A) (B)
Figure 3: Overlapping portfolio networks before (A) and after (B) the optimization. The size
of the nodes corresponds to the total investments in the bond market, the strength of the
links is based on the level of exposure between the banks. Banks are colored according to
their DR. Self-loops are not shown.
for large fractions of the total market. The optimization has lead to a substantial
reduction of systemic risk especially in the group of small, but originally very
systemic banks.
5.1. Network topology
The optimization of systemic risk changes the network topology of the mar-
ket as can be seen by looking at basic network statistics. The density of a
network is given by dividing the number of present links by the number of po-
tential links. In a bipartite network the number of potential links is NK. In
the given sovereign exposure bipartite network the density is 0.51, i.e. about
half of all possible links of the network are actually present. The average num-
ber of bonds in a portfolio (average degree of bank nodes) is roughly 18.27
and the average number of banks holding a particular bond (average degree of
bond nodes) is about 24.86. The liquidity adjusted bank projection shown in
Figure 3A yields a dense network (density = 0.967) with an average degree of
larger than 46. Given that the maximum number of neighbors is 48, we see that
most banks are directly connected to each other by holding same government
bonds. The (unweighted) diameter of this network is 2, meaning that financial
contagion originating from any node theoretically can spread over the whole
market in just two steps. The severity of such a contagious process, however,
depends on the exposure weights.
It is not trivial to answer the question in advance, whether the described
optimization procedure leads to a higher or lower connectedness of the network.
As argued by Gandy and Veraart (2017) and Battiston et al. (2012a), the sta-
bility of a financial network is not a monotonic function of its degrees. Financial
contagion in a highly connected network will spread more evenly, but will reach
nodes with a higher probability. In a sparse network, in contrast, the proba-
bility of contagion is generally less, but this positive effect can be outweighed
by a higher severity of the financial loss due to the more uneven spread of con-
tagion. Thus, the optimal network topology with respect to its completeness
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will depend on the financial conditions of the nodes (e.g. capital buffers) and
the type of interlinkages (e.g. high exposures between relevant banks). In our
case, the optimization leads to a denser network, see Figure 3B. In fact, the
optimized bipartite network is a fully connected; every bank is invested in every
asset in the market. To examine in which way the links are reshuffled, we can
rank the links according to their weight and check which nodes they connect.
The results indicate a tendency to wiring links of high exposures between less
systemic banks compared to the original network. For example, in the optimized
network the largest exposure is between two banks which belong to the ten least
systemic banks, whereas in the original network the largest weight is on the edge
between banks with the third and fourth highest DR values. This qualitative
pattern can be observed for most of the largest weighted links. In that sense,
the optimization produces a network that takes the systemic relevance of the
banks into account. Table 1 gives an overview of some basic network statistics.
For exact definitions consult Appendix D.
To quantify how diversified the portfolios are before and after the optimiza-
tion we compute the Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI) for every portfolio. See
Appendix E for details on the measures. The HHI is a measure for diversifica-
tion, where values close to one indicate highly concentrated portfolios. Values
close to zero indicate a high level of diversification. The average diversification
increases after optimization, see Table 1. The results indicate that the number
of small investments increase with the optimization.
6. SR of original vs. optimized network – a fire-sale simulation
We now test the efficiency of the optimized network in a fire-sale simulation
and compare it with the original network. The assets considered for fire sales are
the banks’ bond holdings only. This is a major simplification of a real setting,
where also other liquid securities such as stocks or derivatives can be sold. The
aim of this simulation is not to present a realistic model of banks in financial
distress, but is to show the difference between both networks in the general case
of fire-sale cascades in the market. Nothing prevents an extension of the model
to include other assets if the corresponding data is available.
6.1. Fire-sale dynamics
The basic decision rules for banks in the fire-sale simulation are inspired by
the approach of Cont and Schaanning (2017) and Greenwood et al. (2015). Let
us consider a simple model for balance sheets. The bond portfolio value of bank
i at time step t is denoted by Vi(t). The value of all other assets of bank i is
denoted by the constant Oi. Ei(t) is the equity of i. The balance sheet identity
must hold for all i and every t,
Vi(t) +Oi
!
= Debti(t) + Ei(t) . (13)
The leverage ratio of bank i is defined as
Li(t) =
Vi(t) +Oi
Ei(t)
. (14)
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original optimized
Market depth Min. 3.65E7
1st Qu. 2.91E9
Median 3.20E10
Mean 1.52E12
3rd Qu. 2.59E11
Max. 3.34E13
DebtRank Min. 0.001 0.003
1st Qu. 0.018 0.010
Median 0.046 0.020
Mean 0.067 0.029
3rd Qu. 0.090 0.052
Max. 0.215 0.087
Average degree weighted 3704.98E6 3616.37E6
unweighted 46.41 48
Clustering coefficient weighted 0.992 1
unweighted 0.975 1
Nearest-neighbor degree weighted 197.57E6 119.09E6
unweighted 46.67 48
Spearman’s ρ 0.70
Kendall’s τ 0.55
Herfindahl-Hirschman index 0.49 0.43
Contagion probability moderate fire sales 16.7% 0%
extreme fire sales 100% 0%
Table 1: Results table
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In this framework, the only possibility to delever is by selling government bonds.
Let us introduce an exogenously specified benchmark leverage ratio L′i, which
bank i must not exceed, i.e. Li(t) ≤ L′i for all t3. Should Li(t) > L′i, the bank
needs to sell a fraction γi of its bonds to fulfill the maximum leverage L
′
i. Then
a γi ∈ [0, 1] must be determined such that
(1− i)L′i =
(1− γi(t))Vi(t) +Oi
Ei(t)
, (15)
with a small i > 0 that takes into account self-triggered price effects emerging
from reducing the balance sheet. Thus, every bank evaluates at every time step
γi(t) =
{
min
{
V (t)+O−(1−i)L′i
Vi(t)
, 1
}
if Li(t) > L
′
i
0 if Li(t) ≤ L′i .
(16)
If the whole portfolio must be liquidated (γi(t) = 1), then there is no possibility
left to delever. γi is set equal to zero for all subsequent times. Note that Equa-
tion (16) represents a simplified case, where banks sell bonds proportionately
and do not sell more liquid assets first. The sale of government bonds leads to
a linear decrease in the price according to Equation (1),
pk(t+ 1) = max
{
pk(t)
(
1−
∑
i γiVki(t)
Dk
)
, 0
}
, (17)
and the new bond portfolio value is
Vi(t+ 1) = max
{
(1− γi)
∑
k
Vki(t)
(
1−
∑
i γiVki(t)
Dk
)
, 0
}
, (18)
where the maximum operators ensure non-negative prices and non-negative
portfolio values. A bank i experiences a price effect on the bonds for sale γiVi(t)
as well as on the remaining bonds (1− γi)Vi(t) in the portfolio. The total loss
of bank i is then given by
Ci(t) =
∑
k
Vki(t)
∑
i γiVki(t)
Dk
. (19)
This loss changes the equity at t+ 1 to
Ei(t+ 1) = max {Ei(t)− Ci(t), 0} . (20)
If Ei(t) = 0, the bank defaults. In this case its portfolio is liquidated at the
current price and the bank is excluded in further rounds. At t + 1 all solvent
banks examine again, whether the leverage condition holds and the dynamics is
repeated. The algorithm stops, once no more selling takes place in the market.
3The condition could be imposed by a regulatory authority or by the bank itself as an
internal business guideline.
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6.2. Results
To induce a fire-sale scenario, one bank is selected and exogenously declared
to be bankrupt. Its entire portfolio is sold, which triggers a price impact on the
assets. This devaluates the portfolios of other banks and the fire-sale dynamics
described above starts. We repeat it for every single bank and compare the
results from the both networks. We define the situation, where at least one bank
goes bankrupt as a response to the initial perturbation, as a contagion event.
The contagion probability is the probability of observing a contagion event in a
fire-sale simulation. We run two different scenarios, a moderate and an extreme
fire-sale scenario. Motivated by Basel III (BCBS, 2014), we use a maximum
leverage threshold L′i = 33 for all i in the moderate scenario. To induce extreme
fire sales we require L′i = Li(0) for all i. Here, banks want to delever to their
initial leverage in case of shocks. This is a more drastic scenario, since every
bank that experiences a price impact will violate the leverage constraint in the
first time step and is forced to sell bonds. Obviously, this behavior is maybe
more drastic than a realistic setting, where banks will typically not try to get
below an initially declared leverage target by all means. The scenario is designed
to investigate the resilience of both network types in extreme cases, where large
fractions of the market are involved.
6.2.1. Scenario 1 – moderate fire sales
Figure 4A shows the histogram of the total bond market value after the
fire-sale cascade in percent of the original market value. We see a clear differ-
ence for the original (red) and the optimized (green) network. In some cases
the portfolio values are reduced by about 7% in the original network. In the
optimized network the portfolio values never decrease by more than 2%. The
left panel of Figure 4B shows boxplots of destroyed equity as a consequence of
the initial default. Although there is only a minor impact on the equity levels
in this scenario, one can still observe that the equity is less affected in the opti-
mized network. The boxplots in the right panel of Figure 4B show the average
leverage ratios of the banks after the fire sales. The horizontal black line is the
average leverage ratio before the simulation. Note that if a bank is close to
default, its equity approaches zero, which may lead to high leverage ratios. The
average leverage ratios in the optimized network after the simulation remain
close to the initial levels. This shows that banks can delever successfully. In
the original network, however, we see that for some simulations leverage ratios
increase significantly, pointing to an increased vulnerability of the banks. The
improved resilience in the optimized network is particularly visible in the low-
ered contagion probability, see Table 1. In the original network the contagion
probability is 16.7%, in the optimized network not a single bank defaults.
6.2.2. Scenario 2 – extreme fire sales
The impact of initial defaults on the market is much stronger in this scenario
than in the moderate scenario, see Figure 4C. In the original network on average
only 3.1% of the total portfolio value remains on the balance sheets after the
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Figure 4: (A) Histogram of portfolio values after moderate fire sales, corrected for the
exogenous devaluation induced by the initial default. This means that 100% refer to the total
bond value in the market excluding the portfolio of the initially defaulting bank. Portfolio
values after fire sales are in general higher in the optimized (green) than in the original (red)
network. (B) Left panel: Boxplots of the destroyed equity after moderate fire sales. More
equity is destroyed as a consequence of an initial default in the original network than in the
optimal. The right panel shows the average leverage ratios after weak fire sales, excluding
defaulted banks. The horizontal black line indicates the average leverage ratio of the banks
before being distressed. The original network is clearly more vulnerable after fire sales than
the optimized network. (C) In the extreme fire-sales scenario large fractions of the portfolios
are sold, but the overall portfolio values are substantially higher in the optimized (green)
network. (D) Left panel: Interestingly, more equity is destroyed in the optimized network.
Yet not a single institution defaults in the optimized case. In the original network banks
default in every single simulation. This demonstrates a much better usage of equity as a
buffer against financial stress in the optimized network. (D) Right panel: leverage is much
lower in the optimized network, indicating much more robust banks.
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fire sales. There is also a strong impact in the optimized network, however,
their values are systematically higher, 6.7%. The impact on the banks’ equity
Figure 4D is higher in the optimized network compared to those in the original
network. This might be surprising at first sight. However, when looking at the
number of bankruptcies in Table 1, as a consequence of the initial perturbation,
we find that the equity buffers are used very differently in the optimized network.
The contagion probability in the original network is 100%, i.e. in every single
simulation banks are defaulting. In contrast, in the optimized network there is
not a single default happening, the contagion probability is zero. Thus, equity
buffers fulfill their intended function much more efficiently in the optimized
network than in the empirical network. The fire sales use up more equity in the
optimized network, but this is done in a way such that the shocks are absorbed.
In the original network, however, some banks hold too little equity and will
default while others hold ‘excess’ equity, which absorptive capacity remains
untouched. While banking regulation based on the Basel accords is stipulating
fixed equity levels as a ratio of risk-weighted and total assets to all banks, this
result shows that the buffer performance of equity is highly network-dependent.
Improving the resilience of a financial network efficiently would mean that the
centrality of the institutions position in the network is taken into account when
defining capital requirements. This would relax capital requirements for less
systemically risky banks. This will incentivize banks to become less systemic in a
given financial network. No such incentives are present in the current regulation
scheme. The right panel of Figure 4D confirms that the optimized network is
much more resilient than the original. Average leverage ratios increase sharply
in the original network. In the optimized network the leverage ratios, even after
extreme fire sales, remain similar to the initial levels4.
It could be argued that restricting the simulation to bond holdings only will
artificially increase financial contagion in the market since other liquid assets
cannot be sold. Note however, that this is not necessarily the case. Recall that
for some banks government bonds do only account for a small fraction of the
balance sheet. For these banks a devaluation of bonds has only a minor impact
on equity and leverage.
7. Discussion
We quantifiied the systemic risk arising through overlapping portfolios in the
European government bond market. We then proposed a general network opti-
mization problem, which is formulated as a standard quadratically constrained
quadratic programming problem. Network optimization allows us to compute
the optimal systemic-risk-efficient asset allocations. When looking for the opti-
mal allocations, we control for the expected return and the standard deviation
of the individual portfolios, such that the principal investment strategies of the
4The model was run with three values for  = 0.01, 0.025 and 0.05. Results are not sensitive
to the different parameter values. Results are only shown for  = 0.025.
16
banks are untouched. We then compared the resilience of the original financial
network with the optimized network.
We showed that systemic risk can be reduced substantially, by more than
50%, for sovereign exposures between important European banks without chang-
ing the risk profiles of the banks’ portfolios. A simple fire-sale simulation con-
firms that the resilience is indeed increased significantly by the optimization:
in case of financial distress, leverage levels and default probabilities are much
lower in the optimized network than in the original network. The essence of the
approach is that in the optimally rearranged network the equity values absorb
economic shocks much more efficiently.
The knowledge of the optimal network topology could be useful to derive
optimal benchmark networks for regulatory purposes. For example, the optimal
network could serve as a benchmark to monitor, whether empirical markets
are diverging (converging) from (to) the optimum. It could also be used as a
benchmark in testing various incentive schemes to reduce systemic risk. For
example, the effect of different measures like systemic risk taxes can be studied
with agent-based models. The benchmark model then can be used to calculate
the effectiveness of the applied measures.
The method proposed here can be extended to other markets than govern-
ment debt. In particular with assets traded mostly on standardized exchanges
such as stocks, reliable liquidity estimates can be obtained. By extending the
model to other asset classes or/and to financial institutions other than banks,
the ‘curse of dimensionality’ must be considered. Every additional asset or insti-
tution increases the number of variables by (N) or K, respectively and increases
the computational cost of the optimization disproportionately. A practically vi-
able remedy could be to exclude less risky institutions in the optimization or
to segment markets according to different asset categories and to apply the
approach to every market segment individually.
The proposed optimization uses constraints on the standard mean-variance
characteristics of the portfolios. However, this is only one way of defining eco-
nomically reasonable constraints and other constraints can be considered that
are more appropriate for specific applications. For instance, risk-weights for
each asset can be derived and a condition imposed such that risk-weighted
investments remain below the total capital level. By using asset haircuts, a
liquidity-based constraint could be introduced, which would ensure that the
investments in a portfolio do not decrease below a certain liquidity threshold.
Other constraints could be designed to limit the concentration in the portfolios,
by defining a maximum proportion of assets per portfolio.
Another interesting extension of the proposed optimization problem would
be to optimize financial networks that represent direct exposures, such as inter-
bank liability networks. Here, the mean-variance condition needs to be substi-
tuted by constraints that the default risk of the individual banks.
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Appendix A. DebtRank
The DR introduced by Battiston et al. (2012c) measures the systemic rel-
evance of banks in a financial network where links between the institutions
represent interbank investments. These interbank relations can be represented
in a matrix A with elements Aij denoting the exposure in monetary units of j
toward i (e.g. interbank liabilities from j to i). Let Ei be the (Tier 1) capital
of i. A bank i defaults, if Ei ≤ 0. No recovery is assumed in the short run, and
therefore, bank j faces a loss of Aij , if bank i defaults. In that case, bank j
defaults if Aij > Ej . The impact matrix W contains elements representing the
direct impact of bank i on j in the case of a default of i defined by
Wij = min
{
1,
Aij
Ej
}
. (A.1)
The relative economic value of node j is defined as
vj =
∑
iAij∑
i
∑
j Aij
. (A.2)
Clearly, we have
∑
j vj = 1. The relative value of the impact of i on its neighbors
is given by Ii =
∑
jWijvj . In order to take effects on nodes at distance larger
1 into account, a PageRank alike feedback centrality measure could be defined
as
Ii =
∑
j
Wijvj + α
∑
j
WijIj , (A.3)
where α < 1 is a dampening factor. The problem with this definition in a
financial context is that the impact can exceed one in the presence of cycles.
Battiston et al. (2012c) suggest a different method which limits the maximum
number of reverberations to one. Consider two state variables for each node,
hi(t) and si(t). hi(t) is a continuous variable between zero and one and si(t)
can take on three different states, undistressed, distressed and inactive, i.e.
si(t) ∈ {U,D, I}. Let S denote the set of banks which are in distress at time
t = 1 and ψ ∈ [0, 1] be the initial level of distress where ψ = 1 means default.
Then the initial conditions are given by
hi(1) =
{
ψ, ∀i ∈ S
0, ∀i /∈ S and si(1) =
{
D, ∀i ∈ S
U, ∀i /∈ S .
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The dynamics for t ≥ 2 is then characterized by
hi(t) = min
1, hi(t− 1) + ∑
j|sj(t−1)=D
Wjihj(t− 1)
 , (A.4)
and
si(t) =

D, hi(t) > 0; si(t− 1) 6= I
I, si(t− 1) = D
si(t− 1), else .
(A.5)
The DR is then defined as RS =
∑
j hj(T )vj −
∑
j hj(1)vj which is the total
induced financial distress (excluding the initial distress) in the network given
the default of a set of nodes S. By taking S = i, the systemic relevance of a
single bank for the overall network can be measured.
Appendix B. QCQP Parameters
In order to satisfy the equivalence between Problem 11 and Problem 12, the
rows of the KN ×KN matrix P0 are specified as follows:
P
r(1)
0 =
[
1
D1
v˜1
E1
, 0, 0, ..., 0,︸ ︷︷ ︸
(K−1)−times
1
D1
v˜1
E1
, 0, 0, ..., 0,︸ ︷︷ ︸
(K−1)−times
...
]
P
r(2)
0 =
[
0, 1D2
v˜1
E1
, 0, 0, ..., 0,︸ ︷︷ ︸
(K−2)−times
0, 1D2
v˜1
E1
, 0, 0, ..., 0,︸ ︷︷ ︸
(K−2)−times
...
]
...
P
r(K+1)
0 =
[
1
D1
v˜2
E2
, 0, 0, ..., 0,︸ ︷︷ ︸
(K−1)−times
1
D1
v˜2
E2
, 0, 0, ..., 0,︸ ︷︷ ︸
(K−1)−times
...
]
P
r(K+2)
0 =
[
0, 1D2
v˜2
E2
, 0, 0, ..., 0,︸ ︷︷ ︸
(K−2)−times
0, 1D2
v˜2
E2
, 0, 0, ..., 0,︸ ︷︷ ︸
(K−2)−times
...
]
...
P
r(K+N)
0 =
[
0, 0, ..., 0,︸ ︷︷ ︸
(K−1)−times
1
DK
v˜N
EN
, 0, 0, ..., 0,︸ ︷︷ ︸
(K−1)−times
1
DK
v˜N
EN
, ...
]
.
{Pi}Ni=1 is a sequence of KN × KN block diagonal matrices of the following
form:
P1 =

Q 0 ... 0
0 0 ... 0
...
...
. . .
...
0 0 ... 0
 , P2 =

0 0 ... 0
0 Q ... 0
...
...
. . .
...
0 0 ... 0
 , ...,
PN =

0 0 ... 0
0 0 ... 0
...
...
. . .
...
0 0 ... Q
 ,
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where Q is the K × K covariance matrix of assets. Furthermore, let r =
(r1, ..., rk)
>, then A1 is a N ×KN matrix given by
A1 =

−r> 0 ... 0
0 −r> ... 0
...
...
. . .
...
0 0 ... −r>

and c1 = (r˜1, ..., r˜N )
>. By denoting the K-dimensional vector of ones as 1K and
the K ×K identity matrix by IK , we can write A2 as the (K +N)×KN block
matrix
A2 =
[
A′
A′′
]
,
with the K ×KN matrix
A′ =
[
IK IK ... IK
]
and the N ×KN matrix
A′′ =

1>K 0 ... 0
0 1>K ... 0
...
...
. . .
...
0 0 ... 1>K
 .
Finally, c2 = −(S1, ..., SK , V1, ..., VN )>.
Appendix C. Impact of market depth scaling parameter c
The parameter c scales the market depth of the whole market. An increase
(decrease) in c increases (decreases) the level of liquidity for all securities by the
same factor. As the strong assumption of a constant market depth is imposed,
c allows to adjust the systemic risk analysis to different liquidity conditions.
For example, c close to zero could be used to approximate market conditions in
times of financial distress in the entire market. In absence of extreme market
events, the parameter should be close to one half (Cont and Schaanning, 2017).
Figure C.5 shows that systemic risk is inversely related to the level of liquidity in
the market. We can see that for extreme liquidity conditions, i.e. regions of low
and high c, the systemic risk of both networks converges. This indicates that
systemic risk can hardly be reduced in cases of extreme (il)liquidity situations.
Appendix D. Network measures
The degree of a node is the number of its links (neighbors). The weighted
degree the sum of all weights between a node and its links (also called strength).
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Figure C.5: Impact of market depth scaling factor on systemic risk. The plot shows systemic
risk as a function of the market depth scaling parameter c. The squares at the lines indicate
the value used for the actual analysis c = 0.4.
Since the overlapping portfolio network is symmetric, we can abstract from
the direction of the links without loss of information. Let w be the weighted
adjacency matrix and w′ the unweighted adjacency matrix, i.e. w′ij = 1 if there
is a positive weight between i and j and w′ij = 0, else.
Degree. The unweighted degree of node i is dui =
∑N
j w
′
ij , and the average
unweighted degree is given by du = 1N
∑N
i d
u
i . Similarly, the weighted degree
(strength) of node i is defined as dwi =
∑N
j wij , and the weighted average degree
is dw = 1N
∑N
i d
w
i .
Clustering coefficient. The clustering coefficient gives the fraction of trian-
gles which are present in the network. The unweighted clustering coefficient is
defined as
Cu =
number of triangles× 3
number of connected triples
and the weighted clustering coefficient for node i can be defined as Barrat et al.
(2004),
Cwi =
1
2dwi (d
u
i − 1)
∑
j,h
(wij + wih)w
′
ijw
′
ihw
′
jh .
The weighted clustering coefficient of the network is just Cw = 1N
∑N
i C
w
i , which
adjusts the number of present closed triplets to their total relative weight.
Average nearest-neighbors degree. The average nearest-neighbors degree in-
dicates how closely related degrees of connected nodes are. The unweighted
average nearest-neighbors degree of node i can be expressed as
dunn,i =
∑
(du)′
(du)′P ((du)′|du) ,
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(Pastor-Satorras et al., 2001) and the unweighted average nearest-neighbors de-
gree is dunn =
1
N
∑N
i d
u
nn,i. The weighted average nearest-neighbors degree of
node i is
dwnn,i =
1
dwi
N∑
j
wijd
u
j ,
(Barrat et al., 2004) and the weighted average nearest-neighbors degree is dwnn =
1
N
∑N
i d
w
nn,i.
Appendix E. Measuring concentration
The Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI) is used to measure the concentration
of a portfolio and is defined as
Hi =
K∑
k
(
Vki
Vi
)2
.
The index captures different aspects of how well investments are balanced over
different assets. Note the similarity to the definition of a sample variance.
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